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In January 2006, the price of natural gas supplied to Moldova increased from $80 to $110 
per thousand cubic meters (mcm). Prices may increase further in the near future, putting 
additional pressures on the economy and leading to adverse effects on the poorest 
households. This study examines the potential impact of higher energy prices on the 
economy of Moldova by simulating the likely macroeconomic consequences of recent 
and future price increases. Moreover, it estimates the direct impact on individual 
households using data drawn from the 2004 Household Budget Survey (HBS). It assesses 
the distributional implications of the price shock, noting how the social impact may vary 
depending on the intensity of energy use, geographic location, and the relative share of 
energy in household expenditure. The results suggest that energy price changes could 
dampen economic growth while putting additional strains on the current account deficit. 
The impact on the poorest households could be significant and protecting them may 
require resources in the amount of 0.7 to 1.7 percent of GDP. This study identifies 
possible policy responses to dampen the shock of the energy price increase and to 
promote the longer-term objective of reducing energy vulnerability. 
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At the end of 2005, Gazprom announced that it was going to increase the price of 
natural gas supplied to Moldova from $80 to $160 per thousand cubic meters (mcm).  
Unable to conclude an agreement, Gazprom halted the supply of natural gas to Moldova 
on January 1, 2006.  In mid-January, to overcome a looming crisis, a temporary 
agreement was reached establishing an interim price of $110/mcm for the first quarter of 
2006 – a 37.5 percent increase- and allowing the resumption in gas supplies from Russia.  
While this temporary agreement was recently extended through the second quarter, it is 
expected that there will be pressure for additional increases in the price of natural gas in 
the coming months.  Higher natural gas prices also have implications for heating and 
electricity prices.  One of the main electricity suppliers to Moldova, the gas-fired 
Cuciurgani power plant (MGRES) in the separatist region of Transnistria, stopped 
supplying power to Moldova at the end of 2005 after failing to reach agreement on a 30% 
increase in the price of electricity supplied.   This note examines the potential impact of 
higher energy prices on the economy of Moldova, explores the distributional implications 




Upon Moldova’s independence in 1991, the massive Soviet energy subsidies as 
well as guaranteed markets for a variety of agriculture and livestock products came to 
end.  This terms of trade shock, among the largest confronted in the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU), contributed to Moldova’s difficult transition from a command to market 
economy.
3  By 2000, per capita GNP was only 40 percent that of 1990 and most 
Moldovan households were below the poverty line. 
 
In the period following independence, Moldova responded slowly to the rapidly 
increasing price of energy imports.  The government - acting simultaneously as policy 
maker, regulator, owner and utility manager – was slow in passing the increase to energy 
consumers and was not able to pay the difference between the supply costs and consumer 
tariffs.  This resulted in a large energy-related quasi-fiscal deficit – estimated at around 
5% of GDP in 1998 – financed in large part through decapitalization of asset base (due to 
lack of maintenance and investments in energy infrastructure) and accumulation of debt, 
mainly in the form of payment arrears.  With financial discipline weakened and the 
quality of management deteriorated, companies had increasing difficulty in maintaining 
supply and shortages in electricity and gas supply developed. This contributed to the 
accumulation of large external debts and the postponement of much need maintenance 
and investments in energy infrastructure. 
                                                 
2 Significant input was provided by Sandu Ghidirim. We also received valuable comments from Asad 
Alam, Paul Bermingham, Edward Brown Robert Gillingham, Nils Junge, David Newhouse, and Peter 
Thomson. Julian Lampietti provided useful suggestions during the initial stages of this study.  
3 The price of energy increased 40-fold in 1992.   3
 
To mitigate the escalating energy crisis, in the late 1990s Moldova embarked on 
an ambitious set of energy sector reforms.  The objective of these reforms was the full 
commercialization of energy supply, accompanied by appropriate social policies 
implemented through fiscal instruments to protect the most vulnerable groups (the so-
called nominal compensation scheme).  The main elements of the reform included: (i) the 
development of a new, market-oriented legal framework; (ii) restructuring and 
corporatization of the industry whereby the country’s vertically integrated electricity 
monopoly was unbundled; (iii) privatization of three out of five electricity distribution 
companies covering about 70% of the market; (iv) divestiture of state shared in the gas 
industry with the majority share in the country’s monopoly gas supplier sold to Russia’s 
Gazprom in exchange for a portion of debt; and, (v) adjustment to the level and structure 
of tariffs where tariffs for all consumers where increased and equalized.
4   
 
As a result of these reforms, payment collections increased especially in the 
electricity sector.  While some collection problems persist, particularly with state-owned 
entities – such as district heating and water companies – collection rates reached 92% for 
gas and 98% for electricity in 2005.  Further, the quasi-fiscal deficit has been 
significantly reduced and the government has stopped accumulating external debt for gas 
and electricity imports. 
 
III.  Energy Dependency and Vulnerability 
 
Moldova is poorly endowed with 
energy resources and it imports almost all of 
its primary energy (over 99 percent in 2003).  
Natural Gas, imported from Russia, 
comprises nearly two-thirds of energy 
imports and it is the main fuel for local 
electricity generation and district heating. 
Petroleum products account for about 20% 
of all energy imports and the electricity 
imports represent about 10 percent of all 
energy imports (see Table 1). The power 
generation system on the right bank of the 
Nistru river comprises of only three 
combined heat-and-power plants, covering 
about one-third of domestic electricity 
consumption. The rest of Moldova’s 
electricity needs are imported from Ukraine, 
Transnistria, and, to lesser (and limited) 
extent, from Romania.  Residential 
                                                 
4  In 2003, ANRE approved differentiated electricity and gas tariffs, reflecting costs, consumption and 
voltage levels.  In 2004, a social tariff for electricity and gas was also introduced – with a  reduce price for 
electricity consumption of up to 50 kWh and a social tariff to residential gas consumers for consumption up 
to 30 cubic meters per month. 
Table 1.  2003 Energy Balance 
(1000s tons of  oil equivalent - ktoe)
1000s tons Percent
Sources
Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) 3,267          
  Internal Sources 61               
  Imports 3,255           100%
    Petroleum Products 640              20%
    Natural Gas 2,185           67%
    Coal 122              4%
    Electricity 308              9%
  Exports  (12)             
  Stock Changes  (37)             
Uses
TPES 3,267          
Energy Conversion and Distribution Losses (1,519)        
Total Final Energy Consumption (TFEC) 1,748           100%
    Industry Sector 338              19%
    Agriculture Sector 97                6%
    Transportation Sector 316              18%
    Commercial and Public Services 168              10%
    Residential 661              38%
    Other 168              10%
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics 2003.  4
consumption accounts for about 40 percent of the total final energy consumption (TFEC) 
due to relatively low share of industrial consumption (only about 19 percent of TFEC).
5 
The second largest consumer of energy is the transport sector which accounts for about 
18 percent of TFEC.   
 
The high vulnerability of Moldova to external energy price shock is determined 
by its dependence on imported natural gas as the main energy source and its high energy 
intensity which, despite the low level of energy consumption by industry, is relatively 
high (0.54 tons of oil equivalent (toe)/000$ of GDP at PPP) – about two times energy 
intensity of Romania and three times energy intensity of Germany. On the other hand, per 
capita consumption of energy in Moldova (0.77 toe/pc) is significantly below energy 
consumption in Romania (1.79 toe/pc) and Germany (4.21 toe/pc) which indicates a 
relative “energy poverty” of Moldova and the demand potential if the country is to 
achieve its objective of sustainable economic growth and poverty elimination. This also 
indicates that the most vulnerable categories of consumers may not have much capacity 
to reduce their demand further in response to the raising energy prices, which underscores 
the importance of well targeted safety net. 
 
An important element of Moldova’s exposure to the energy price shock is the 
relatively low level of its gas tariffs (about US$3/Gigajoule (GJ)) in comparison with 
other countries in the South East Europe (SEE) where average gas prices are in the range 
of US$6-7/GJ (see Appendix Figure 1). This implies significant discount at which 
Moldova has been able to secure gas supplies relative to the European parity price
6, 
which was in the order of $230/mcm this winter. The electricity price differential is 
smaller since the average price of electricity in Moldova (6 US cents/kWh) is closer to 
the average electricity tariffs in the SEE countries (see Appendix Figure 2).  
  
 Given its almost complete 
dependency on imported energy, higher 
energy prices will immediately result in 
a larger import bill.  If no offsetting 
financing is available the demand for 
other imports must be reduced. This 
implies a reduction in domestic 
consumption and investment demand 
and reduced domestic production.  The 
simplest calculation to estimate the 
direct impact of higher energy prices on 
GDP is based on the ratio of imports to 
GDP.
7  In addition to the size of energy 
imports relative to GDP, the impact of 
higher energy prices on GDP will 
                                                 
5 By comparison, industry consumes over 40% of TFEC in Ukraine and Romania and 30% in Germany.  
6 The European parity price would be the price of natural gas supplied by Gazprom to Romania and other 
SEE countries net of transit costs after Moldovan border.  
7 In 2004, energy imports amounted to about 12 percent of GDP (or 18 percent of total imports).   
Table 2:  Impact on GDP of Higher Energy Prices
Price In % of GDP
Shock 1 year 2 year 
A 2006 2007
  Scenario 1 - Natural Gas Price of $110/tcm
Partial impact
   oil and oil products  10.0% -0.8% -0.7%
   natural gas  37.5% -1.1% -1.0%
   electricity 30.0% -0.5% -0.4%
Composite (joint) impact -2.4% -2.1%
  Scenario 2 - Natural Gas Price of $160/tcm
Partial impact
   oil and oil products  10.0% -0.8% -0.7%
   natural gas  100.0% -3.0% -2.6%
   electricity 80.0% -1.3% -1.1%
Composite (joint) impact -5.1% -4.4%
Source: Bank staff calculations.  5
depend on the price elasticity of energy demand (the more inelastic the demand for 
energy, the more a price increase reduces GDP). 
 
Utilizing a simple net import model, the so-called “terms of trade” impact on 
GDP of higher energy prices is presented in Table 2.  These calculations can be viewed 
as an indicator of the severity of the price shock on the economy (but it remains a very 
static view of what would otherwise be a dynamic adjustment in the economy).  As in the 
rest of the note, two different scenarios are presented.  The first scenario incorporates the 
increase in natural gas prices to $110/mcm (37.5 percent relative to 2005) and assumes 
that electricity prices will be increased by 30 percent.  The second scenario assumes that 
the increase in natural gas prices will be larger – to $160/mcm or 100 percent relative to 
2005- and, as a result, electricity prices will also increase faster (by up to 80 percent)
8.  In 
both scenarios, the increase in petroleum price is assumed to be the same (10 percent). As 
can be seen from Table 2, in the first scenario higher energy costs can be expected to 
lower the level of GDP relative to the 2005 base year by 2.4% in the 2006 and additional 
2.1% in 2007. If the increase in energy prices is even greater, as assumed in scenario 2, 
the negative impact on GDP will be even larger – lowering GDP by over 5% in 2006 and 
4.4% in 2007. 
9 
 
As assessment of the more dynamic impacts of higher energy prices on the 
economy is, of course, a more complex undertaking. Moldova, like the rest of the world, 
has already been adjusting to higher petroleum prices. The import bill for energy 
increased by nearly $150 million (or nearly 5 percent of GDP) in 2005. This contributed 
to a widening of the trade deficit from 30 percent of GDP in 2004 to 38 percent in 2005.   
At the same time, however,  remittances (compensation and transfers) grew by nearly 
$240 million with the result that the deterioration current account deficit was significantly 
smaller – the current account deficit widened from 2.7 percent in 2004 to about 5.5 
percent in 2005. The inflow of remittance also contributed to strong consumption growth 
with the result that real GDP growth remained strong in 2005 with growth reaching 7.1 
percent. At the same time, tight monetary and fiscal policy helped contain inflationary 
pressures and the year end inflation rate was 10 percent – a decline relative to 2004 
(which ended the year with an inflation rate of 12.6 percent). 
 
The increase in natural gas prices in 2006 will put additional pressures on the 
economy. In particular, we estimate that higher energy prices will have the following 
impacts: 
 
Economic Growth:  Prior to the revision in natural gas prices, it was assumed 
that the Moldovan economy would begin slowing down.  The rapid increase in 
remittances experienced by Moldova will unlikely be sustained in the medium term and, 
hence, will contribute to a slowing down in consumption and construction activity over 
                                                 
8This assumption is based on the marginal cost of electricity produced in gas-fired power plants (such as 
MGRES) where the short-run cost is mainly cost of natural gas. 
9 The price elasticity of demand for energy in Moldova is assumed to be 0.055 in the first year and 0.2 in 
the second year.  That is, a 100 increase in prices will reduce demand by 5.5 percent in the first year and 20 
percent in the second.  No change in the transit fees for natural gas is assumed under this simple model.      6
the medium term.  The increase in the cost of energy experienced to date will, along with 
this expected slowdown in remittance growth, contribute to slower economic growth.  
Given these current energy prices, over the medium term, economic growth is expected 
to slow to around 5 percent per annum.   If natural gas prices are increased still further 
(i.e. to $160/mcm) economic growth can be expected to slow by an additional 0.5-1.0 
percentage points, mainly through the impact on reduced consumption. The 
manufacturing sector in Moldova is a relatively small share of the economy, with the 
energy-intensive industries in particular accounting for a minor share of this sector.  
 
External Position:  Moldova is a very open economy.  Imports of goods and 
services reached nearly 90 percent of GDP in 2005 with energy imports amount to around 
15 percent of GDP.   The slowdown in domestic consumption, and hence imports, will 
help offset some of the impacts of higher energy prices on the external position.  With 
gas prices at $110/mcm the current account deficit will likely remain slightly above 5 
percent of GDP in the next few years.  If, however, gas prices were to rise to $160/mcm, 
then that deficit will likely widen further (by around 1.5-2.0 percent of GDP) with the 
deficit remaining in the 6-7 percent of GDP in the near term.    The widening current 
account deficit will put pressure on Moldova’s otherwise stable exchange rate and some 
depreciation can be expected (by about 5-10 percent).    
 
Fiscal Policy:  An increase in natural gas prices will contribute to a widening of 
the fiscal deficit given the higher direct consumption costs by the government as well as 
lower revenues – consumption of imports will be shifted towards natural gas which is 
subject to a lower VAT rate since Russia continues to collect indirect taxes at origin on 
gas exports to Moldova.  Under the IMF PRGF program - predicated on a natural gas 
price of around $110/mcm - fiscal policy is programmed to remain tight with an overall 
deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP.  If natural gas prices were to increase further, it can be 
expected to add an additional 0.5-0.8 percent of GDP to the deficit. 
 
Inflation:  Under the IMF program, fiscal and monetary policy is expected to 
remain tight contributing, along with slower growth, to reduced inflationary pressures 
despite higher energy prices (i.e. gas at $110/mcm).  Inflation, under this program, is 
targeted to fall and remain in the single digits over the program period.  If, however, 
natural gas prices were to increase further, some additional inflationary pressures can be 
expected because of the pass through effect.  While prudent fiscal and monetary policy 
will contribute to the maintenance of price stability (with the openness of the Moldova 
economy also contributing), inflation will likely be closer to 12-15 percent.   7
 
IV.  Distributional Implications of Higher Energy Costs  
 
While the energy price shocks can be expected to have broad macroeconomic 
implications, the distributional impact of these higher prices will differ across households 
and location (i.e., large cities, small towns and rural areas).
10 In the first instance, the 
direct impact of higher energy costs on individual households will depend on whether 
that household is a consumer of gas and/or other energy products.  In addition, the 
distributional impact also depends on how the intensity of energy use or consumption 
level varies across household quintiles and geographic location. Finally, the impact 
depends on the relative share of gas and energy products in total household expenditure. 
Households who spend larger shares of their budgets on energy are expected to bear a 
greater burden of the price increase. 
 
Who are connected? 
 
Almost all households are connected to electricity while the connection rates for 
central heating and central gas and the consumption incidence of liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPGs) vary by location. As shown in Table 3, while over 70 percent of households in 
large cities (Chisinau and Balti) and small towns are connected to central gas services, 
only 11 percent of rural house are connected.
11 On the other hand, most rural households 
consume gas cylinders or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while few households in large 
cities consume them. About a quarter of all households and over three-quarters of 
households in small towns and rural areas, respectively, consume LPG. As for electricity, 
virtually all households are connected. Central heating, on the other hand, is mainly an 
urban consumption item. 
 
                                                 
10 Energy expenditures are extracted from Moldova Household Budget Survey 2004, a survey conducted 
every year since 1997. By design, about 660 households are sampled to be interviewed each month. As it is 
virtually impossible to achieve a 100 percent response rate, in 2004 the total number of observations in the 
final dataset is 6121. Collection rates are relatively high across energy products (or have been steadily 
increasing, where collection rates have been historically low, such as in heating) and this increases 
confidence in the general reliability of HBS data. The consumption aggregate created by the World Bank’s 
poverty assessment team is used as a proxy of household welfare, with a single modification. The poverty 
assessment team excluded three consumption categories (utility, housing, and durables) from final 
consumption aggregate (see also World Bank, 2004). For the purposes of this analysis, however, utility 
expenditures are included and the new per capita consumption quintiles are based on this adjusted 
aggregate.  
11 There is an additional geographic dimension to connection rates and consumption: The few rural 
households connected to central gas tend to be concentrated in a few specific localities, due to the 
Moldovan Village Program and the multi-year program aimed at gradually connecting all villages to the 
gas network.   8
Table 3. Connection Rates, 2004
(In percent of all households)
Energy Product
Quintile Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. All households
Poorest 22.5 68.5 97.3 9.1
Second 30.2 62.1 98.9 16.2
Third 31.3 61.4 99.6 20.8
Fourth 37.5 55.5 99.6 28.3
Richest 47.8 38.7 99.8 44.5
All 35.2 55.7 99.2 25.7
Of which:
A1. Large Cities
Poorest 67.0 0.0 97.2 97.8
Second 66.0 3.4 97.3 97.8
Third 69.5 1.9 99.4 98.2
Fourth 76.2 0.7 99.7 97.8
Richest 69.6 1.6 99.8 95.3
All 70.8 1.5 99.4 96.7
A2. Small towns
Poorest 67.8 29.9 95.8 19.2
Second 73.7 25.0 99.6 20.0
Third 76.0 23.7 99.6 21.2
Fourth 74.2 25.4 99.6 13.3
Richest 78.4 21.6 100.0 12.6
All 74.1 25.0 99.0 17.4
A3. Rural areas
Poorest 7.3 83.7 97.8 …
Second 11.5 83.2 98.9 …
Third 9.1 87.4 99.7 …
Fourth 10.6 88.3 99.6 …
Richest 15.4 83.4 99.8 …
All 10.7 85.4 99.2 …
Source: HBS and Bank staff calculations.
Note: "…" indicate insufficient observations.    9
Who spends the most on energy in absolute terms?  
 
In absolute terms, expenditure on gas and energy products is generally progressive across 
all locations. Average monthly household expenditures on gas, electricity and central 
heating, across quintiles and location are summarized in Appendix Table 1.
12  In absolute 
terms, richer households spend more on energy than poorer households. Central gas 
spending of households in large cities is not strongly regressive; consumption levels are 
more or less even across the first four quintiles. As for LPG, poorer households generally 
spend a little more than richer households. This is not surprising, given the relatively 
lower central gas connection rates among poorer households; LPG thus serves to some 
extent as substitute to central gas. 
 
Expenditure levels in absolute terms vary across energy products and across 
geographical locations. Rural households appear to have the highest expenditures on 
central gas and lowest on electricity, while the opposite is true for large cities. This 
primarily reflects housing peculiarities of urban and rural households, with central gas 
being used typically for cooking (and very rarely for heating dwellings) in large cities but 
for both cooking and heating in rural areas where it is available.   
 
What are the expenditure shares of energy? 
 
Electricity expenditures are more burdensome for poorer households and account 
for a larger share of household expenditure than all other gas and energy products 
combined. Since payment capability varies substantially across Moldovan population, it 
is critical to look at distributional impacts of potential tariff changes in relative terms. 
Taking all households together—where both unconnected households as well as 
households that are connected but have missing expenditure data are assumed to have 
zero expenditures on energy—electricity expenditures account for almost 5 percent of 
household budgets, on average, while other gas and energy products account for 0.5 to 
1.8 percent of budgets (Table 4, Item A). Spending on electricity is somewhat regressive: 
the poorest quintile spends 5.4 percent of their budget on electricity while the richest 
quintile spends only 3.6 percent – which indicates relatively inelastic demand for basic 
electricity uses such as lighting. In contrast, the richest quintile spend a larger share of 
their budget on central heat (1.8) compared to the lowest quintile (0.1). The expenditure 
patterns for central gas and LPG, on the other hand, are neither clearly regressive nor 
progressive when looking across all households across all locations together. 
                                                 
12 Two pieces of information drawn from the 2004 HBS allow us to calculate the average monthly 
expenditures on gas and energy. The first is the reported magnitude of expenditure. The second is the 
reference period for the reported expenditures. The second piece of information is drawn from a new 
survey question introduced in the 2004 HBS. Seasonality of consumption presents one methodological 
challenge, particularly in the case of central heating.  The HBS data reports expenditures on central heating 
year-round.  This may reflect the design of the billing cycle which allows for expenditure to be spread over 
the entire year.  The estimates reported in this note, therefore, are based on the assumption that the 
observed expenditures on central heating do, in fact, reflect actual spending patterns.   10
Table 4. Average Expenditure Share of Energy Products 
(By expenditure quintile and location in percent of total household consumption)
Energy Product
Quintile Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. All households
1
Poorest 1.0 0.4 5.4 0.1
Second 1.8 0.4 4.9 0.4
Third 1.7 0.4 4.9 1.0
Fourth 2.1 0.5 4.5 1.5
Richest 1.9 0.4 3.6 1.8
All 1.8 0.4 4.6 1.1
B. Connected households with positive expenditures
2
Poorest 6.4 11.3 6.5 …
Second 7.1 8.7 5.6 14.4
Third 6.6 7.1 5.5 16.1
Fourth 6.3 6.3 5.0 15.8
Richest 4.6 4.4 4.3 11.0
All 5.9 6.5 5.2 13.4
Of which:
B1. Large Cities
Poorest 5.5 … 7.8 …
Second 3.6 … 8.0 14.3
Third 3.2 … 7.9 16.1
Fourth 2.6 … 6.9 15.8
Richest 2.1 … 5.3 11.0
B2. Small towns
Poorest 7.3 13.2 7.9 …
Second 8.4 12.0 6.8 …
Third 8.6 10.5 6.3 …
Fourth 10.6 8.8 5.6 …
Richest 10.4 6.3 4.8 …
B3. Rural areas
Poorest 5.0 10.0 6.1 …
Second 7.9 8.0 5.0 …
Third 8.3 6.4 4.7 …
Fourth 10.2 5.8 4.2 …
Richest 7.6 4.2 3.3 …
Source: HBS and Bank staff calculations.
Note: "…" indicate insufficient observations.
1Unconnected households as well as households that are connected but have missing expenditure 
data are  assumed to have zero expenditures on energy.
2Includes only households that are connected and are reporting expenditure information. Implicitly, the
calculations include households that are connected but have missing expenditure data, and these
households are assumed to have expenditure levels equal to average expenditures by quintile and
location.
   11
Aggregate numbers based on both connected and unconnected households may 
mask important variations and distributive dimensions. Focusing only on households that 
are connected and have positive expenditures on gas and energy products reveals a 
number of important patterns (see Item B in Table 4):  
 
First, the expenditure shares of gas and energy products are large when the 
calculations are restricted to households that are connected and have positive 
expenditures of gas and energy products.
13 On average, for these households, gas 
products and electricity account for 5 to 6 percent of households budgets. As for central 
heat, spending amounts to about 13 percent of household budgets in large cities.  
 
Second, whether the expenditure patterns are progressive or regressive depends 
on the energy product and geographic location (see Items B1 to B3 in Table 4). For 
example, central gas expenditures in large cities are a greater burden on poor households. 
In small towns and rural areas, however, richer households spend a larger share of their 
income on central gas. On the other hand, expenditure on LPG is consistently more 
burdensome for the poor, accounting for at least 10 percent of the budgets of the poorest 
quintiles. Central heating, on the other hand, is mostly a consumption item in large cities 
and is neither clearly progressive nor regressive. Electricity expenditures are more 
burdensome for poorer households across all locations. 
 
What is the short-term distributional impact of the gas price increase? 
 
The impact on households of higher energy tariffs is modeled under two different 
scenarios.  In the first, natural gas and central heating prices are increased by 37.5 percent 
to reflect a natural gas price of $110/mcm up from the $80/mcm price that prevailed until 
early 2006. Electricity prices under this scenario are assumed to increase by 30 percent 
given the importance of gas in electricity generation.
14 In the second scenario, where the 
price of imported natural gas is expected to increase to $160/mcm, central gas and 
heating tariffs are expected to increase by 100 percent while electricity tariffs rise by 80 
percent, proportional to the gas price increase. Because the impact is largely a function of 
expenditure levels and shares, the expected distributional effects are consistent with 
variations in consumption levels and expenditure shares documented in the previous 
section. 
 
In absolute terms, the effect of the price increase is generally progressive. 
Increasing gas, electricity, or central heating tariffs would cause bills of richer households 
to grow by a greater absolute amount than those of poorer ones, because of the higher 
intensity of energy use (except for LPG) among richer households.  
 
                                                 
13 One of the fundamental problems in dealing with household budget data is the treatment of missing 
values. Implicitly, the second set of calculations (Item B in Table 4) also includes households that are 
connected but having missing expenditure information. The Methodology assumes that these households 
have expenditure levels equal to the average expenditure of the reporting households. 
14 The assumption of a 30 percent increase is consistent with the relative share of fuel in the production cost 
of gas-fired power plants supplying electricity to Moldova. This is also consistent with the price increase 
requested by one of the main electricity suppliers at the end of 2005.   12
In relative terms, however, the distributional impact varies depending on whether 
all households, both connected and unconnected, or only the sub-sample of households  
that are connected and reporting positive expenditures are included in the calculations. 
Table 5 reports summary information the impact of the gas price increase, under the two 
scenarios, expressed in percent of household expenditure. The calculations allow for 
some substitution away from the relatively more expensive goods.
15  
 
The cumulative impact of higher energy costs, expressed in percent of household 
expenditures, is neither strongly progressive nor regressive. For Moldova as a whole, 
taking all households together—both connected and unconnected households—the 
combined impact of the price increase of all gas and energy products is neither 
progressive nor regressive (Table 5, Item A). However, the impact in percent of 
household expenditures can be quite large. Under the second scenario, for example, the 
cumulative impact of the rising cost of energy is between 4 and 5.5 percent of household 
budgets. 
 
Among connected households that are reporting expenditure information, the 
distributional effect of the price increase, expressed in percent of household expenditures, 
varies by location and by energy product (Table 5, Items B to B3). Rising tariffs on 
central gas and LPG will impact all households in small towns and in rural areas, while 
growing central heating costs will be the most painful for dwellers of large cities. Not 
surprisingly, because almost all households are connected to electricity, its increasing 
cost will be burdensome for households across all locations. Its impact is also 
consistently regressive across all locations. Similarly, there are regressive effects 
following the LPG price hike in small towns and rural areas. Rising central gas tariffs 
have somewhat regressive effects in large cities and progressive effects everywhere else. 
The impact of the increasing cost of central heating is neither regressive nor progressive. 
 
The effects on the budgets of connected households can be large, particularly for 
the poorest households (Table 5, Items B to B3). For example, for the poorest 
households, the price increase of LPG under the two scenarios amounts to 3.2 to 7.2 
percent of their budget in rural areas and 4.3 to 9.6 percent of their budget in small towns. 
In contrast, the price increase amounts to 2 to 4.5 percent and 1.4 to 3 percent of the 
budgets of the richest households in rural areas and small towns, respectively.  Even for 
energy products that are projected to have progressive effects—that is, tariff increases 
reflect a larger share of the budgets of the richer households—the impact on the poorest 
                                                 
15 This is based on a geometric mean of the relative price change where consumption behavior is assumed 
to be responsive to a change in relative prices and households substitute consumption away from the 
relatively more expensive good (see also Pollak, 1989; Gupta and others, 2000; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 1997; Dalton, Greenlees and Stewart, 1998). Alternatively, one could assume zero substitution 
(arithmetic mean) corresponding to the case when consumption levels (quantities) remain fixed following a 
price increase (see, for example, Freund and Wallich, 1997). There is empirical evidence that the elasticity 
of electricity and gas consumption is about 0.1, i.e., 100 percent increase in the price of gas/electricity 
would cause a 10 percent reduction in consumption. Thus, impact estimates that allows for some 
substitution may be more appropriate. However, the estimated effects based on zero substitution, though of 
larger magnitudes, are in the same direction as those reported in Table 4. See Appendix Table 2.   13
households is not trivial. For example, the impact of rising central gas tariffs amount to 
2.4 to 5.2 percent of the budgets of the poorest households in small towns. 
 
Table 5. Impact of Gas Price Increase
(By expenditure quintile and location in percent of total household consumption)
Scenario 1: Impact by Energy Product Scenario 2: Impact by Energy Product
Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat
Magnitude of price increase/ 37.5% 37.5% 30% 37.5% 100.0% 100.0% 80% 100.0%
Quintile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. All households
1
Poorest 0.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.7 0.3 3.2 0.1
S e c o n d 0 . 60 . 11 . 30 . 1 1 . 30 . 32 . 90 . 3
Third 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.3 1.2 0.3 2.9 0.7
F o u r t h 0 . 70 . 21 . 20 . 5 1 . 40 . 32 . 71 . 1
Richest 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.6 1.3 0.3 2.1 1.2
B. Connected households with positive expenditures
2
Poorest 2.1 3.7 1.7 … 4.5 8.2 3.9 …
Second 2.3 2.8 1.5 … 5.1 6.2 3.4 …
Third 2.1 2.3 1.5 … 4.7 5.0 3.3 …
Fourth 2.1 2.0 1.3 … 4.7 4.4 3.0 …
Richest 1.5 1.4 1.2 … 3.4 3.1 2.7 …
Of which:
B1. Large Cities
Poorest 1.8 … 2.3 … 3.9 … 5.2 …
Second 1.2 … 2.1 4.7 2.7 … 4.8 10.4
Third 1.0 … 2.2 5.3 2.2 … 4.9 11.8
Fourth 1.0 … 1.9 5.2 2.1 … 4.3 11.6
Richest 0.7 … 1.5 3.6 1.6 … 3.5 7.9
B2. Small towns
Poorest 2.4 4.3 2.1 … 5.2 9.6 4.7 …
Second 2.7 3.9 1.8 … 6.1 8.7 4.1 …
Third 2.8 3.4 1.7 … 6.3 7.6 3.8 …
Fourth 3.6 2.9 1.5 … 7.9 6.3 3.4 …
Richest 3.5 2.0 1.3 … 7.8 4.5 2.9 …
B3. Rural areas
Poorest 1.6 3.2 1.6 … 3.5 7.2 3.7 …
Second 2.6 2.6 1.3 … 5.8 5.7 3.0 …
Third 2.7 2.1 1.3 … 6.0 4.6 2.9 …
Fourth 3.3 1.9 1.1 … 7.4 4.1 2.5 …
Richest 2.5 1.4 0.9 … 5.5 3.0 2.0 …
Source: HBS and Bank staff calculations.
Note: "…" indicate insufficient observations. Based on a geometric mean of the relative price change.
1Unconnected households as well as households that are connected but have missing expenditure data are assumed to have zero expenditures on energy.
2Includes only households that are connected and are reporting expenditure information. Implicitly, the calculations include households that are connected 
but have missing expenditure data, and these households are assumed to have expenditure levels equal to average expenditures by quintile and location.
 
 
What is the fiscal cost of protecting the poorest households? 
 
Under the same two scenarios for natural gas price increase, the aggregate 
increase in expenditures on gas and energy products is estimated. The upper bound on the 
aggregate increase is calculated by assuming that consumption levels are unchanged (no 
substitution). The estimates reflect the effective cost of protecting all or selected  
   14




Natural Gas Price $110/tcm $160/tcm
Quintile 1000s lei % of GDP 1000s lei % of GDP Distribution 
All connected households
2
Poorest 88,637 0.3 236,366 0.7 10.2
Second 118,697 0.4 316,525 1.0 13.6
Third 153,824 0.5 410,199 1.3 17.6
Fourth 211,584 0.7 564,224 1.8 24.2
Richest 297,627 0.9 793,671 2.5 34.1
Total 872,949 2.7 2,327,863 7.3 100.0
B. Connected households with positive expenditures
3
Poorest 30,535 0.1 81,426 0.3 6.9
Second 52,836 0.2 140,896 0.4 11.9
Third 76,053 0.2 202,808 0.6 17.1
Fourth 114,484 0.4 305,290 1.0 25.8
Richest 170,434 0.5 454,490 1.4 38.4
Total 444,336 1.4 1,184,896 3.7 100.0
Source: HBS and Bank staff calculations.
1See Table 4 and main text for a description of the two scenarios.
2These simulations assume that connected households with missing expenditure data have energy 
expenditure  levels equal to the average expenditure levels of households with non-missing
observations.
3These simulations exclude connected households with missing expenditure data.
 
household quintiles, to keep them as well off as they were prior to the energy price 
increases.
16 
                                                 
16 Table 5 presents two sets of estimates: The first assumes that connected households with missing 
expenditure data are spending the average amount of expenditures on energy. The second excludes 
households with missing expenditure data. Clearly these are two extreme assumptions. The first set of 
estimates is arguably upward biased because connected households are not necessarily consuming positive 
amounts of energy or may not be paying for the energy they consume. On the other hand, the second set of 
estimates could be downward biased because missing expenditure data may be due to any number of 
factors, including infrequency of payments, inability to identify energy product-specific expenditures, or 
the simple failure to report such expenditures in the HBS. The high collection rates across energy products   15
Protecting the energy consumption of households from the two poorest quintiles 
requires energy subsidies of about 0.7 to 1.7 percent of GDP under the two scenarios.
17 
When the calculations are restricted to connected and paying households, the fiscal cost is 
much lower: 0.3 percent of GDP under the first scenario and 0.7 percent of GDP under 
the second scenario. However, these calculations assume that households in the poorest 
quintiles can be perfectly targeted by safety nets. In practice, they are not. The 2004 
Poverty Assessment (World Bank, 2004), in particular, finds that some 32.9 percent of 
the budget on gas and energy compensations accrue to the non-poor. Some 44 percent of 




The rising cost of energy may have significant health and environmental costs as 
households switch to cheaper sources of fuel. Based on the results of focus group 
discussions, for example, some rural households in Moldova were found to rarely cook or 
heat with electricity; they typically use wood, coal, or gas instead.
18 HBS data is not 
likely to provide a reliable estimate of the switch to dirty fuel following the rising cost of 
network sources of energy, because there are few observations on wood or coal use. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that with the price of electricity and natural gas 
increasing, households (and rural households, in particular, who are more likely to be 
poor) will indeed switch to less expensive but dirtier sources of energy and this may lead 
to significant health and environmental costs. For example, burning dirty fuels may 
degrade indoor and outdoor air quality, and this, in turn may lead to worsening health 





V.  Policy Implications 
 
It is clear that Moldova is highly vulnerable to gas price increases, and that 
upward price pressures are likely to be a fact of life in the coming years. In developing 
and implementing its policy response, the government should recognize that: (a) gas 
imports are likely to continue to play pivotal role in the energy balance of Moldova in the 
long term; and (b) Moldova has in its hands the task of reducing its energy vulnerability 
by improving energy efficiency, reducing energy waste and developing alternative energy 
resources. The following recommendations provide a broad roadmap for policy makers in 
Moldova in this regard. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
also suggest that many of the missing expenditure data are not necessarily due to nonpayment. The two sets 
of calculations should thus be treated as an indicative range of estimates. 
17 The most recent Poverty Assessment finds that the poverty rate is close to 40 percent. The two poorest 
quintiles provide a rough approximation of households in poverty. 
18 Junge and others, 2004, Sharing Power: Lessons Learned from the Reform and Privatization of 
Moldova’s Electricity Sector (Washington: The World Bank). 
19 See Lampietti, ed., 2004, Power's Promise: Electricity Reforms In Eastern Europe And Central Asia  
(Washington: The World Bank).   16
•  Gradually increase utility service tariffs (for gas, electricity and heat) to full cost 
recovery level, while maintaining financial discipline in order to avoid quasi-
fiscal activities associated with non-payments, accumulation of debts and decline 
in the scope of maintenance activities; 
 
•  Maintain hard budget constraints on energy producers, suppliers and consumers to 




•  Identify administrative, regulatory and other impediments for investments in 
energy efficiency and alternative energy resources. Develop and implement 
measures to increase incentives and facilitate investments in energy efficiency and 
alternative (renewable) energy resources, including use of flexible mechanisms 
under the Kyoto Protocol; and 
 
•  Improve institutional capacity in the government for contingency planning and 
rapid response to an uncertain evolution of energy prices in the medium-term, 
particularly from the point of view of their impact on the most vulnerable 
population groups. 
 
Oil and gas price pressures are driven by market forces that are essentially beyond 
the influence of policy makers in Moldova, except for the policies governing energy (gas 
and electricity) transits through Moldova. In this area, Moldova should aim to establish a 
record of good transit country and preferred route for the energy trade between the CIS 
energy market and the South East European (SEE) energy market, which is a part of the 
EU Internal Energy Market. Adopting and implementing principles governing the Energy 
Community of SEE (ECSEE), in which Moldova participates as observer, would go a 
long way in improving transparency and regulation in the energy sector which are key in 
attracting energy trade and related investments. Key measures in this regard include: 
 
•  Perform benchmarking of the energy sector legislation in relation to provisions of 
the ECSEE Treaty and the EU energy (gas and electricity) directives and identify 
compliance barriers; 
 
•  Based on the legal benchmarking, develop and implement necessary adjustments 
in the market design and the regulatory framework to allow for a gradual opening 
of the gas and electricity market in line with the ECSEE Treaty and the EU 
directives; and 
 
•  Mobilize investments needed to expand (and/or free) transmission capacity on the 
main energy trade corridors with Ukraine and the South East Europe, including 
investments required for interconnection of Moldova’s power grid with the 
UCTE. 
                                                 
20 Where energy consumption is not metered and where payments are based on household or dwelling 
characteristics, there is scope for increasing efficiency through individual metering.   17
 
The government may wish to consider several options for dampening the shock of 
energy price increase to the poor.  An apparent option is to utilize the existing Nominal 
Compensation Program, which has already been providing utility subsidies to selected 
categories of population.
21  At present, the Program is not means-tested and as a result, its 
poverty targeting efficiency is not very high.  Nonetheless, the government is about to 
implement a pilot targeting measures with the assistance of EU-FSP in a small number of 
raions.  If the experience of the pilot program proves to be positive, the government may 
wish to accelerate the application of the targeting mechanism to the rest of the country. 
 
Nominal compensations are increasing in real terms but more slowly than other 
allowances.  Rationalizing other allowances could provide some space for reallocating 
resources to nominal compensations, in particular, using some of the revenues of the 
Republican Fund for the Support of the Population to pay for a temporary expansion of 
the Nominal Compensation Program. These revenues are extra-budgetary. While the 
spending from the Fund is increasing, the efficiency and effectiveness of the spending 
leave rooms for improvement. 
 
Finally, should the government decide to use the Nominal Compensation Program 
or other mechanism to dampen the impact of the energy cost shock, it will be highly 
desirable to build an effective sunset clause in the mechanism.  If not, such a program 
will be highly vulnerable to political pressures to extend it permanently.  First, the 
government should communicate clearly and widely that the measure will be temporary.  
Second, it is advisable to make program renewals more difficult by requiring super-
majority (2/3 of votes rather than a simple majority vote of over 50%) for any renewal 
attempt to be approved by the Parliament if possible. 
 
It is also important not to index the value of subsidies to prices or actual utility 
consumption because doing so would raise expectation for program renewal (in spite of 
the sunset clause) and prevent the uncontrollable increase of subsidy expenditures.  
Ideally, the government should like to provide cash benefits based on poverty 
characteristics of the household, and de-link the provision of cash benefits from the 
process of utility bill payment (as it is now under the nominative compensation scheme 
for urban households).  In fact, in many countries (including Indonesia and Brazil), the 
trend is to include (or convert) energy subsidies into part of (proxy-)means tested 
comprehensive cash transfer (or conditional cash transfer) to protect poor/vulnerable 





                                                 
21 People/children with disabilities, WWII veterans and their spouses (and those similar in status), families 
of those who died in Chernobyl or during execution of service duties, families with at least four children 
under 18, people who worked on the labor front during WWII, and survivors of the Leningrad blockade.   18
  Appendix Table 1. Average Monthly Expenditures on Energy
(By expenditure quintile and location in lei)
Energy Product
Quintile Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. All households
1
Poorest 6.3 2.7 27.9 0.6
Second 12.1 3.2 33.0 3.1
Third 14.2 4.0 38.9 8.6
Fourth 21.7 5.0 44.8 16.1
Richest 30.1 6.2 57.3 26.4
B. Connected households with positive expenditures
2
Poorest 38.4 76.0 33.2 …
Second 47.8 70.3 37.7 101.8
Third 55.3 66.5 43.6 138.2
Fourth 65.9 65.5 49.8 168.4
Richest 72.3 70.9 67.9 165.8
Of which:
B1. Large Cities
Poorest 28.2 … 48.7 …
Second 24.3 … 57.5 101.9
Third 23.3 … 69.1 138.7
Fourth 27.0 … 73.3 168.4
Richest 38.2 … 92.8 165.4
B2. Small towns
Poorest 42.7 79.4 41.5 …
Second 51.5 80.3 41.4 …
Third 68.2 77.0 46.0 …
Fourth 101.6 70.3 50.4 …
Richest 131.6 76.5 65.0 …
B3. Rural areas
Poorest 34.7 73.7 30.6 …
Second 62.5 65.2 34.3 …
Third 84.2 64.4 38.0 …
Fourth 124.8 64.4 40.9 …
Richest 139.3 70.3 48.4 …
Source: HBS and Bank staff calculations.
Note: "…" indicate insufficient observations.
1Unconnected households as well as households that are connected but have missing expenditure 
data are  assumed to have zero expenditures on energy.
2Includes only households that are connected and are reporting expenditure information. Implicitly, the
calculations include households that are connected but have missing expenditure data, and these
households are assumed to have expenditure levels equal to average expenditures by quintile and
location.  19
 
Appendix Table 2. Impact of Gas Price Increase: Assuming Base Consumption Levels Are Unchanged (No Substitution)
(By expenditure quintile and location in percent of total household consumption)
Scenario 1: Impact by Energy Product Scenario 2: Impact by Energy Product
Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat Central Gas LPG Electricity Central Heat
Magnitude of price increase/ 37.5% 37.5% 30% 37.5% 100.0% 100.0% 80% 100.0%
Quintile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. All households
1
Poorest 0.4 0.2 1.6 0.0 1.0 0.4 5.4 0.1
Second 0.7 0.1 1.5 0.2 1.8 0.4 4.9 0.4
Third 0.6 0.2 1.5 0.4 1.7 0.4 4.9 1.0
Fourth 0.8 0.2 1.4 0.6 2.1 0.5 4.5 1.5
Richest 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.7 1.9 0.4 3.6 1.8
B. Connected households with positive expenditures
2
Poorest 2.4 4.2 1.9 … 6.4 11.3 6.5 …
Second 2.7 3.3 1.7 5.4 7.1 8.7 5.6 14.4
Third 2.5 2.7 1.6 6.1 6.6 7.1 5.5 16.1
Fourth 2.4 2.3 1.5 5.9 6.3 6.3 5.0 15.8
Richest 1.7 1.7 1.3 4.1 4.6 4.4 4.3 11.0
Of which:
B1. Large Cities
Poorest 2.1 … 2.3 … 5.5 … 7.8 …
Second 1.3 … 2.4 5.4 3.6 … 8.0 14.3
Third 1.2 … 2.4 6.1 3.2 … 7.9 16.1
Fourth 1.0 … 2.1 5.9 2.6 … 6.9 15.8
Richest 0.8 … 1.6 4.1 2.1 … 5.3 11.0
B2. Small towns
Poorest 2.8 5.0 2.4 … 7.3 13.2 7.9 …
Second 3.2 4.5 2.0 … 8.4 12.0 6.8 …
Third 3.2 3.9 1.9 … 8.6 10.5 6.3 …
Fourth 4.0 3.3 1.7 … 10.6 8.8 5.6 …
Richest 3.9 2.4 1.4 … 10.4 6.3 4.8 …
B3. Rural areas
Poorest 1.9 3.8 1.8 … 5.0 10.0 6.1 …
Second 3.0 3.0 1.5 … 7.9 8.0 5.0 …
Third 3.1 2.4 1.4 … 8.3 6.4 4.7 …
Fourth 3.8 2.2 1.2 … 10.2 5.8 4.2 …
Richest 2.8 1.6 1.0 … 7.6 4.2 3.3 …
Source: HBS and Bank staff calculations.
Note: "…" indicate insufficient observations. Based on a arithmetic mean of the relative price change.
1Unconnected households as well as households that are connected but have missing expenditure data are assumed to have zero expenditures on energy.
2Includes only households that are connected and are reporting expenditure information. Implicitly, the calculations include households that are connected 
but have missing expenditure data, and these households are assumed to have expenditure levels equal to average expenditures by quintile and location.  20
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Two Indexes of Price Change 
 
This technical appendix is based heavily on the discussion of indexes of price 
change in Pollak (1989), Gupta and others (2000), and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1997)
22. The paper uses two measures of the increases in the cost of living or the 
corresponding fall in real income: one based on an arithmetic index of relative price 
change, the other is based on a geometric index of price change. These are two widely 
used measures of relative price change and also underlie recent debates (such as on the 
U.S. CPI) on how best to account for substitution in measuring relative price change. 
 
The arithmetic index, also known as the Laspeyres index, is a measure of relative 
price change R
A from time t to time t+1, based on a comparison of the sum of weighted 
prices in time t+1 with the sum of the weighted prices in time t+1, keeping the same 
exact items and the same exact quantities as in the base period in the consumption basket. 
It is calculated as follows: 
 
(1)  
i t i t











where Pt+1,i and Pt,i are the prices of the i-th item in the comparison and base periods, 
respectively, and Qt,i is the quantity of the i-th item consumed in the base period. 
 
The geometric index is a measure of relative price change R
G from time t to time 























where Pt+1,i and Pt,i are the prices of the i-th item in the comparison and base periods, 
respectively, and wt,i is the share of the i-th item in total household expenditure. The 
relationship of equation (1) to equation (2) can be seen by rewriting the arithmetic or 
Laspeyres formula as an arithmetic mean of price relatives, weighted by expenditure 
shares from the base period: 
 






















                                                 
22 See also Dalton and others (1998) and Shapiro and Wilcox (1998).   22
Equivalently, one could think of R
A and R
G as measures of compensations needed 
to make the household as well off as they were prior to the price change; in other words, 
household utility or well-being is kept constant or at base period levels. In the case of the 
arithmetic or Laspeyres index, this is consistent with the items and quantities of 
consumption being kept constant, with underlying preferences that can be described by a 
Leontief utility function (i.e., no substitution). In the case of the geometric index of 
relative price change, the estimate reflects Cobb-Douglas preferences, with expenditure 
shares constant across time and allowing for substitution away from relatively more 
expensive goods while keeping household utility constant.
23 
 








t (a), (1-a) P
t+1
Good X 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.50
Good Y 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00
 
 
For example, suppose a household consumes only two goods (X and Y). 
Appendix Table 3 reports the base period prices and consumption as well as the 
expenditure.
24 Assume that the base period prices are both 1.00 and total expenditure is 
2.00. Suppose the price of good X rises in the next period to 1.50.  
 
Using the arithmetic index (equation 3), the relative price change is equal to 1.25 
= [(0.5*1.5)+(0.5*1.00)] representing a 25 percent increase in prices or a 25 percent fall 
in real household income. Using the geometric index, the price change would only be 
22.5 percent, or 22.5 = [(1.5)
0.5*(1.0)
0.5], as it allows changes in spending patterns in 
response to changes in relative prices. To compensate for the fall in real income, the 
arithmetic index implies a compensation of 0.50 = 0.25*(2.00). The household can then 
spend 2.50 on the base period quantities and keep Leontief utility constant, U = 
min{X,Y}. 
 
The geometric index, however, implies only a compensation of 0.45 = 
0.225*(2.00). In this second case, the household can spend 2.45 on goods X and Y while 
keeping expenditure shares constant. In particular, the household can buy 0.82 unit of 
                                                 
23 The expression for R
G is equal to the ratio of the Cobb-Douglas expenditure function for the reference 
period to the expenditure function of the base period (see also Pollak 1989) 
24 The example is drawn from BLS (1997).   23
good X and 1.22 units of good Y; at the new price levels, expenditure shares remain 












Which measure of price change or fall in real income is more appropriate? It 
depends on whether possibilities for substitution exist but the two approaches should 
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